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In re C.P.: The Ohio Supreme Court's
Expansion of Roper v. Simmons and Graham
v. Florida to the Realm of Juvenile Sex
Offender Registration
by BEN BLUMENTHAL*
Introduction
In 2005, prosecutors charged C.P., an eleven-year-old boy in
Utah, with sodomy and aggravated sexual abuse of a child.' Both
charges stemmed from allegations that C.P. had performed illicit
sexual acts on his half-sister-three years his minor-over the course
of several years.2 C.P. admitted these charges.3 In light of his
admissions, a Utah juvenile court placed C.P. in temporary foster care
and sentenced him to serve thirty days with the Department of
Juvenile Justice Services.!
The following year, in 2006, a classmate alleged C.P.
inappropriately touched her at school.' Given his history, the Utah
court placed C.P. in a residential treatment program for juvenile
sexual offenders. There, he received inpatient care until November
2008 when he returned home to his mother.! That living arrangement
proved unworkable, however, and in June 2009, C.P. moved to Ohio
* J.D. Candidate 2014, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
2006, University of California, Santa Cruz, Legal Studies. The author would like to thank
Professor David Faigman for his guidance throughout the writing process. The author
would also like to thank his family and friends for their love and support.
1. In re CP., 967 N.E.2d 729, 751 (Ohio 2012) (O'Donnell, J., dissenting).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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to live with his father. After living in Ohio for nine days, C.P., then
fifteen years old, raped his six-year-old nephew.9
Ohio prosecutors immediately filed "two counts of child rape
and one count of kidnapping with sexual motivation" against C.P.,
and moved to transfer jurisdiction to try him as an adult."o However,
the juvenile court judge denied the state's motion, finding that
options within the juvenile justice system had not been "exhaustively
tried."" In juvenile court, C.P. admitted each charge in the
indictment.12 Pursuant to his admissions, the court sentenced C.P. to
serve time with the Ohio Department of Youth Services and-
consistent with Ohio's version of the Adam Walsh Child Protection
Act-notified C.P. of his automatic responsibility to register as a Tier
III sex offender for life.'3
This series of events-conspicuously omitted from the majority
opinion-formed the factual basis of a landmark 2012 Ohio Supreme
Court Case, In re C.P.14 In that case, the court held the statute
mandating C.P.'s automatic lifetime registration as a sex offender"
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and Ohio's own constitutional prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment." Additionally, the court found automatic
registration ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause."
In re C.P. is anomalous for two primary reasons. First, although
registration schemes are almost exclusively considered civil rather
than punitive in nature, the Ohio Supreme Court applied its recent
holding in State v. Williams" to find Ohio's juvenile registration
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 733.
12. Id. at 751 (O'Donnell, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 749, 751-52.
14. Id. at 729.
15. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.86 (2013).
16. In re C.P., 796 N.E.2d at 732. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; OHIO CONST. art. I
§ 9. As this Note is primarily concerned with In re C.P.'s application of federal
constitutional law, I will only briefly discuss the Ohio Supreme Court's analysis under this
state constitutional provision.
17. In re C.P., 976 N.E.2d at 732.
18. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ohio 2011) (declaring Ohio's current
registration scheme punitive in nature).
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statute constituted cruel and unusual punishment.9 Second, the court
interpreted two recent U.S. Supreme Court opinions, Roper v.
Simmonsm and Graham v. Florida,2 1 to compel its result under
circumstances far different than either of those cases presented. In so
doing, the court grouped Ohio's automatic registration requirement,
when applied to juveniles, in the same class of cruel and unusual
punishment as the death penalty, and life in prison without the
possibility of parole for nonhomicide offenses, when similarly
imposed upon minors. However, because of its sweeping reasoning
regarding registration itself, the opinion also strongly implied the very
nature of lifetime reporting requirements-with or without the
discretion of juvenile judges-was categorically unconstitutional.2 2
In re C.P. thus raises several critical questions. Chief amongst
them' is whether categorical principles enunciated in Roper and
Graham should even apply to juvenile sex-offender registration
schemes. This question is highly relevant because an affirmative
answer thereto-as represented by In re C.P.-could foreshadow a
dramatic shift away from current majoritarian thought on registration
schemes generally, and in the juvenile context specifically. This Note,
however, attempts to answer this question in the negative, arguing
that In re C.P.'s implicit categorical ban on lifetime registration for
juveniles is unsustainable under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Yet, this Note further contends that the United States Supreme
Court's subsequent ruling in Miller v. Alabama23 provides the Ohio
Supreme Court a solid framework within which to set a far more
supportable precedent. In short, Miller held juveniles may not
automatically be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole
19. Williams was in direct conflict with the Ohio Supreme Court's own prior rulings
on the nature of sex-offender registration, all federal circuit courts that have considered
the issue, and the United States Supreme Court. See In re C.P., 976 N.E.2d at 752
(O'Donnell, J., dissenting).
20. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding the death penalty is cruel and
unusual punishment for any offense committed as a juvenile).
21. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding life without the possibility of
parole is cruel and unusual punishment for a juvenile convicted of a crime other than
murder).
22. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 744 ("In sum, the limited culpability of juvenile
nonhomicide offenders who remain within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the
severity of lifetime registration and notification requirements of PRQJOR status, and the
inadequacy of penological theory to justify the punishment all lead to the conclusion that
the lifetime registration and notification requirements in R.C. 2152.86 are cruel and
unusual.").
23. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
459
under the Eighth Amendment, but may still face such stringent
punishment after individualized consideration.2 4 Based on this new
precedent, the Ohio Supreme Court should revisit In re C.P. In so
doing, the court should unambiguously allow for lifetime juvenile sex
offender registration and should only invalidate the automatic
imposition thereof under the Eighth Amendment. If registration
were to be considered punishment at all, such a clarification would
cure the infirmity of In re C.P.'s strained applications of Roper and
Graham and give lower courts definitive guidance on the boundaries
of their discretion.
In order to reach these conclusions, Part I of this Note briefly
explores the history of Ohio's registration scheme as it progressed in
reaction to national trends and federal legislation. Part II discusses
the Ohio Supreme Court's rulings regarding registration leading up to
and including Williams, and contrasts that opinion with the U.S.
Supreme Court's most recent holding regarding sex offender
registration statutes. Next, Part III examines In re C.P.'s holdings in
depth, highlighting the court's application of Roper and Graham in its
Eighth Amendment analysis. Then, Part IV argues that In re C.P.
relied far too heavily on Roper and Graham outside of their original
contexts. Finally, Part V argues that the Ohio Supreme Court should
revisit In re C.P. in light of Miller and explicitly allow juvenile judges
the discretionary authority to impose lifetime registration
requirements.
I. Ohio's Sex Offender Registration Scheme
Ohio first implemented a simplistic sex offender registration
scheme in 1963, though it was rarely applied.25  Those statutes,
contained in Chapter 2950 of Ohio's Revised Code ("Chapter 2950"),
remained unaltered until the mid-1990s. 26 Since then, Chapter 2950
has been strengthened and amended pursuant to new legislative
findings in order to comply with revised federal legislation."
The first major revision to Chapter 2950 came in 1996, when the
Ohio General Assembly enacted its version of Megan's Law.'
Initially, New Jersey created Megan's Law in 1995 after a convicted
24. Id. at 2469.
25. 130 Ohio Laws 669-72; State v. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d 753, 756-57 (Ohio 2010).
26. Id. at 757.
27. Id.
28. Id. (citing Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2560, 2601).
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sex offender raped and murdered his neighbor's young child.2 9 In
response to this gruesome crime, New Jersey imposed new
requirements on convicted sex offenders, including registration and
public notification.30 Congress soon followed suit and enacted the
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act ("Jacob's Act").3' Jacob's Act required
state governments to enact new registration and notification
standards or forgo certain federal funding.32 Accordingly, Ohio
incorporated these requirements into its revised registration scheme.
The Ohio General Assembly again modified its sex offender
registration requirements in 2003.3 Those new revisions were based
on the General Assembly's "finding that all sex offenders pose a risk
of engaging in further sexually abusive behavior after being released
from prison and that the protection of the public from those offenders
is a paramount governmental interest."3  Accordingly, "registration
requirements were made more demanding, the community-
notification and residency-restriction provisions were made more
extensive, and sheriffs' authority was expanded to include the power
to obtain landlord verification that the offender lived at a registered
address." "
Then, in 2006, Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child
Protection and Safety Act ("AWA")." Title I of the AWA, the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), updated
guidelines for sex offender notification and registration, and sought to
create a nationalized standard of classification and reporting." To
that end, Congress created a three-tiered classification system based
solely on the offense, with Tier III encompassing the most serious
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994) (repealed 2006).
32. Id.
33. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 757 (citing Am.Sub.H.B. No. 180, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II,
2560, 2601).
34. Id. at 758 (citing Am.Sub.S.B.No. 5, 150 Ohio Laws, Part IV,6558, 6687-702).
35. State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ohio 2008) (citing Legis. Serv. Comm'n,
B. Analysis, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 5 (2003)).
36. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 759 (citing Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d at 121-22 (Lanzinger, J.,
dissenting)).
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16902 (2006).
38. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 759.
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crimes. 9 In order to ensure compliance, Congress tied ten percent of
states' federal crime control funds to conformity with the AWA.40
Ohio passed its own version of the AWA in 2007, which
introduced heightened regulations for sex offenders.4 In particular,
under the new legislation, an offender was required to:
[R]egister with the sheriff in the county in which he
lives, the county in which he attends school, the county
in which he is employed, any county in which he is
domiciled temporarily for more than three days, and
even a county in another state if he works or attends
school there. When he registers, he must provide his
full name and any aliases as well as his date of birth,
social security number, address, the name and address
of his employer and school, the license plate of any
motor vehicle he owns or operates as part of his
employment, his driver's license number, any
professional or occupational registration or license,
any e-mail address, and all Internet identifiers or
telephone numbers registered to him.42
The regulations imposed new notification requirements as well.43 In
particular, "any statements, information, photographs, or fingerprints
that an offender is required to provide [were] public record and much
of that material [was] now included in the sex-offender database
maintained on the Internet by the attorney general.""
Furthermore, when Congress passed the AWA in 2006, it
mandated that registration and notification requirements apply to
juveniles adjudged delinquent of a limited number of serious
offenses.45 Ohio's registration scheme complied with that
requirement, creating a new subset of juvenile sexual offenders for
39. 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2006).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 16925(a) (2006).
41. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2950.01-2950.99 (2013).
42. Bodyke, 933 N.E.2d at 761 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.04(A)(2)(a)-
(e) (2008)).
43. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.081 (2008).
44. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 2011).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (2006). In 2011, however, the Attorney General
promulgated new rules designating these requirements discretionary rather than
mandatory. Supplemental Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 76
Fed. Reg. 1630, 1632 (Jan. 11, 2011).
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purposes of registration: Public Registry Qualified Juvenile Offender
Registrants ("PRQJORs").4 6 PROJORs were a narrowly defined
portion of juvenile sexual offenders aged fourteen to seventeen who
committed offenses such as rape, sexual battery, and aggravated
murder when sexual gratification was motivation.47 Under the newly
enacted legislation, PROJORs were automatically subject-without
judicial discretion-to lifelong registration and community
notification, reviewable only after twenty-five years.'
H. Ohio's Judicial Stance Towards Registration
Turns Against National Tides
The Ohio Supreme Court has considered ex post facto challenges
to each amended variation of the state's registration schemes since
Megan's Law.49 Ex post facto prohibitions are in both the United
States and Ohio State Constitutions. They forbid "any statute which
punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent
when done, which makes more burdensome the punishment for a
crime, after its commission.""o Thus, if the court found Ohio's
registration scheme punitive, it could not be applied to those
convicted of sex offenses prior to the new scheme's enactment.
In 1998, the Ohio Supreme Court determined the then-existing
version of Chapter 2950 was not punitive in nature, but rather a civil
remedy directly aimed at the General Assembly's stated purpose of
public safety." Reiterating the legislature's "irresistible conclusion,"
the court noted "there was no justification for ... not applying [the
statute] to previously-convicted offenders ... [because] the
notification provision of the law would have provided absolutely no
protection whatsoever on the day it became law, for it would have
applied to no one."52 Accordingly, the court found Chapter 2950
violated neither federal nor state constitutional prohibitions against
46. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.86(A)(1) (2013).
47. In re C.P., 976 N.E.2d 729, 735 (Ohio 2012) (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2152.86 (2013)).
48. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.86(B)(1) (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2950.15(C)(2) (2008).
49. See State v. Cook, 700 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio 1998); State v. Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d 110
(Ohio 2008); Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1112.
50. Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70 (1925).
51. Cook, 700 N.E.2d at 585.
52. Id. at 578.
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ex post facto laws when applied against offenders whose convictions
predated the new regulatory scheme."
The court reached an identical conclusion when it considered an
ex post facto challenge to Chapter 2950 as amended in 2003.54 The
court acknowledged the increased burdens registrants would face
under the new legislation, but rejected an argument that Chapter
2950 had "transmogrified the remedial statute into a punitive one.""
Instead, noting the General Assembly's "clear reaffirmation of an
intent to protect the public from sex offenders," the court found the
new regulations merely represented an "effort to better protect the
public from the risk of recidivist offenders by maintaining the
predator classification so that the public had notice of the offender's
past conduct-conduct that arguably is indicative of future risk."5 1
In 2010, however, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed course" and
became only the third state supreme court to deem a registration
scheme punitive. In Williams, the court found that revisions made in
2008 to Chapter 2950 had traversed the boundary of punishment, thus
violating the state's prohibition against ex post facto laws. 9 The court
cited the lack of judicial discretion in the new sentencing scheme, as
well as increased reporting and notification requirements in general,
as forming the basis for its new stance on Chapter 2950.6 In that
regard, the court emphasized, "no one change compell[ed] our
conclusion that [the new regulations are] punitive."" Rather, it was
''a matter of degree whether a statute is so punitive that its retroactive
application is unconstitutional." 62
Williams was not simply a departure from the Ohio Supreme
Court's own precedent, but it also stands in direct opposition to the
53. Id. at 588.
54. See Ferguson, 896 N.E.2d at 110.
55. Id. at 117.
56. Id. at 118.
57. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1112 (Ohio 2011).
58. See Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009) ("[T]he non-punitive
purpose of the Act, although of unquestioned importance, does not serve to render as
non-punitive a statute that is so broad and sweeping."); State v. Letalien, 985 A.2d 4, 26
(Me. 2009) ("[W]e hold that the retroactive application of the lifetime registration
requirement and quarterly in-person verification procedures of SORNA of 1999... is
punitive.").
59. Williams, 952 N.E.2d at 1113. The court found it unnecessary to address the
Federal Constitution's ex post facto clause. Id. at 1110.
60. Id. at 1113.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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United States Supreme Court's ruling in Smith v. Doe. In Smith, the
Court rejected an ex post facto challenge to Alaska's sex offender
registration laws.' Under that statutory scheme, offenders convicted
of aggravated sexual crimes were forced to register quarterly for life
and notify police of their intention to change residences.65
Furthermore, an offender's "name, aliases, address, photograph,
physical description, description, license [and] identification numbers
of motor vehicles, place of employment, date of birth, crime for which
convicted, date of conviction, place and court of conviction, length
and conditions of sentence" were publicly available on a state
website.6 Finding Alaska's scheme remedial rather than punitive, the
Court emphasized "[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a
State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction
of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory
consequences. ,67
In light of Smith, Judge O'Donnell of the Ohio Supreme Court
noted in his lengthy dissent in Williams that "whether a
comprehensive registration regime targeting only sex offenders is
penal is not an open question."8 Because Judge O'Donnell found no
significant differences between the Alaska statute at issue in Smith,
the previous versions of Chapter 2950 deemed civil by the court, and
its current incarnation, he argued that Ohio's registration scheme
remained remedial in nature. Ultimately, however, that argument
failed. Through its holding in Williams, the Ohio Supreme Court laid
the necessary foundation for its ruling in In re C.P.
III. In re C.P. Takes Williams to the Next Level on the Heels
of Roper and Graham
Quoting Williams, In re C.P. began its analysis by reiterating that
"all doubt is removed: R.C. Chapter 2950 is punitive."7 Accepting
that determination, the court moved on to note, "in recent years, the
[United States Supreme Court] has established categorical rules
63. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 90-91.
66. Id. at 84.
67. Id. at 103-04.
68. State v. Williams, 952 N.E.2d 1108, 1121 (Ohio 2011) (O'Donnell, J., dissenting)
(quoting United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011)).
69. Id.
70. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 734 (Ohio 2012).
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prohibiting certain punishment for juveniles."" That precedent,
embodied in Roper and Graham, requires us to briefly consider each
of those cases before analyzing the Ohio Supreme Court's application
of their underlying principles in In re C.P.
A. Roper Alters Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
In Roper, the appellee, Christopher Simmons, was seventeen
years old when he committed murder.72 Mr. Simmons was arrested
shortly thereafter and confessed to the crime." Consequently, a
Missouri court tried Mr. Simmons as an adult and a jury convicted
him of murder.74 Mr. Simmons was later sentenced to death," but
appealed his sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, arguing that
imposition of the death penalty for a crime committed as a juvenile
was categorically cruel and unusual." The United States Supreme
Court eventually ruled in Mr. Simmons's favor, overturning its prior
ruling that had allowed sentencing to death a juvenile over the age of
fifteen.
As the Court explained in Roper, the Eighth Amendment's
guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment is based on the
"precept of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated
and proportioned to [the] offense."" In beginning its analysis, the
Court in Roper noted that this prohibition, "like other expansive
language in the Constitution, must be interpreted according to its
text, by considering history, tradition, and precedent, and with due
regard for its purpose and function in the constitutional design."" To
that end, the Court applied a two-part inquiry to determine the
constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty." The first half of the
Court's test focused on "objective indicia of consensus, as expressed
71. Id. at 737.
72. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566-67 (2005). The Court detailed Mr.
Simmons' crime, which involved a nighttime home invasion in which he and another
juvenile bound their victim, drove her to a bridge spanning the Meramac River in
Missouri, and threw her into the water below to drown. Id.
73. Id. at 557.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 558.
76. Id. at 559.
77. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
78. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560 (alteration in original) (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304,311 (2002)).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 564.
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in particular by the enactments of [state] legislatures that have
addressed the question."' The second part of the Court's test
consisted of its own review of whether execution was a per se
"disproportionate punishment for juveniles."'
In the first part of its analysis, the Court found that a majority of
states either outlaw the death penalty entirely, or explicitly exempt
juveniles from capital punishment.? The Court concluded that there
was a national consensus against executing juveniles.8 The second
half of the Court's test focused primarily on clear sociological
distinctions between juveniles and adults. Specifically, the Court
emphasized three primary distinguishing factors: (1) "[a] lack of
maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in
youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among
the young""; (2) that "juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure" ;
and (3) "that the character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that
of an adult."' Given these distinctions, the Court concluded the
"diminished culpability of juveniles" as compared to adults
necessarily undermined the dual purposes of the death penalty:
punishment and deterrence.8 Accordingly, the Court held the death
penalty could not be imposed on those who committed their crimes
before they turned eighteen.'
B. Graham Follows Suit
In Graham, the Court built upon Roper and found the principles
underlying that opinion similarly forbade life sentences without the
possibility of parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders." In that
case, the defendant, Terrance Graham, pleaded guilty as an adult to
armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery
for crimes committed when he was sixteen years old.91 The former
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 565-67.
84. Id. at 567.
85. Id. at 569 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
86. Id. (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105 (1982)).
87. Id. at 570.
88. Id. at 571.
89. Id. at 574.
90. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
91. Id. at 2018.
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offense carried a maximum penalty of life in jail, while the latter
carried a maximum penalty of fifteen years imprisonment.9 Yet, the
sentencing judge withheld adjudication and instead imposed
concurrent three-year probation terms." Six months later, however,
Mr. Graham was again arrested for armed burglary and evading
police.94 A different state judge found Mr. Graham had violated his
probation and shown a pattern of increasing violence.5 Based on
those findings, the court sentenced Mr. Graham, now nineteen years
old, to spend the rest of his life in prison without the possibility of
parole for his previous armed burglary conviction.6
In determining whether Mr. Graham's sentence constituted cruel
and unusual punishment, the Court applied the same two-part inquiry
from Roper, looking first to find a national consensus before applying
its own independent review of this type of punishment.97 Applying
the first half of its test, in contrast to Roper, the Court found the
majority of states allow juveniles to receive life sentences for
nonhomicide crimes. However, the Court noted legislation was not
necessarily the touchstone of its analysis." Instead, noting such
sentences were exceedingly rare, the Court found "an examination of
actual sentencing practices in those jurisdictions" that permit "life
without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders" discloses a
consensus against the sentence."
Transitioning to the second half of its inquiry, the Court
explained, "[t]he judicial exercise of independent judgment requires
consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of
their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the
punishment in question."'o' Given these parameters, the Court
reiterated its finding from Roper that a juvenile's moral culpability is
distinctly different from that of an adult&0 Accordingly, the Court
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2019-20.
96. Id. at 2020.
97. Id. at 2021.
98. Id. at 2023.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 2026.
102. Id. at 2028-29.
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reaffirmed Roper's central tenet that juveniles as a whole are "less
deserving of the most severe punishments.,,'os
With that underlying principle intact, the Court moved on to
distinguish nonhomicide offenses from murder. Specifically, the
Court emphasized that "[a]lthough an offense like robbery or rape is
'a serious crime deserving serious punishment,' those crimes differ
from homicide crimes in a moral sense."'04 Thus, when compared to
"an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to
kill has a twice diminished moral culpability."'o The Court then
turned to Mr. Graham's sentence.
Analyzing the sentence of life without the possibility of parole,
the Court began by noting such a sentence is the "second most severe
penalty permitted by law."'o The Court further explained that while
a death sentence (the most severe) is unique in its irrevocability, "life
without parole sentences share some characteristics with death
sentences that are shared by no other sentences."' Given the gravity
of this type of punishment and the Court's finding of a lack of
penological justification as applied to juveniles, the Court concluded
that life without the possibility of parole is a categorically cruel and
unusual punishment for non-homicide crimes committed as a
juvenile.'o
C. In re C.P. Applies Roper and Graham to an Entirely Different
Category of "Punishment"
Finally, we turn to the Ohio Supreme Court's application of
Roper and Graham in the context of Ohio's juvenile registration
scheme. In deconstructing In re C.P., it is important to note that the
court invalidated automatic lifetime registration on three distinct
grounds: the Eight Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual
punishment, Ohio's own constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The court's three separate analyses will be considered in
turn. However, because this Note focuses on the court's application
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence-which comprised the vast
103. Id. at 2026.
104. Id. at 2027 (quoting Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1987)).
105. Id.
106. Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991)).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2030.
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majority of the court's analysis-the following discussion will
emphasize this particular inquiry.
1. Eighth Amendment Analysis
Having accepted the premise that Chapter 2950 imposes
"punishment" at the outset of its opinion, the Ohio Supreme Court
applied the same two-part test from Roper and Graham to determine
whether automatic lifetime registration constituted cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.'? In looking first to find a
national consensus on the issue, the court presented evidence showing
many states were in fact opposed to juvenile registration."o
The court began its analysis by examining the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act's ("SORNA") slow path towards
acceptance since its inception in 2006."' Specifically, the court noted
that in spite of Congress's threat of reduced crime control funding for
states that did not adopt SORNA, only three states had substantially
complied with SORNA as of 2011.n2 The court then presented
evidence showing *the primary barrier to states' implementation of
SORNA was its juvenile registration requirement." In particular, the
court quoted a 2009 study from the National Consortium for Justice
Information and Statistics, which found that "'[t]he most commonly
cited barrier to SORNA compliance was the act's juvenile
registration and reporting requirements, cited by 23 states."' 4
Additionally, the court emphasized that in reaction to these
concerns-and states' noncompliance-the U.S. Attorney General
promulgated new regulations in 2011 making certain disclosures of
juvenile registrants' information discretionary rather than
mandatory." The court thus concluded that states' resistance to
SORNA, and the Attorney General's attempts to lessen juvenile
registration requirements in response thereto, was "reflective of a
national consensus against the very policy that Ohio imposed as part
109. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 738 (Ohio 2012).
110. Id. at 738-39.
111. Id. at 738.
112. Id. Ohio was the first state to comply. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting National Consortium for Justice Information and Statistics, Survey
on State Compliance with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)
(2009), http://www.search.org/files/pdflSORNA-StateComplianceSurvey2009.pdf (last
visited Nov. 6, 2013)).
115. Id. at 739.
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of its attempt to comply with SORNA.""' Having fulfilled its goal of
finding a national consensus on juvenile registration, the court moved
to the second half of its inquiry under Roper and Graham's cruel and
unusual punishment analysis.
The court began by emphasizing the importance of its duty to
independently review Chapter 2950 in determining its
constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment."' In order to
conduct that review, the Ohio Supreme Court undertook a careful
study of the state's juvenile registration scheme, examining several
factors the United States Supreme Court enunciated in Graham."'
Those factors were: (1) the culpability of the offenders; (2) the nature
of the offenses; (3) the severity of the punishment; and (4)
penological justifications."9 Each factor will be addressed in turn.
In considering the culpability of the offenders, the court stressed
the same clear differences between juveniles and adults that formed
the basis for the Supreme Court's rulings in Roper and Graham.20
Those key differences included juveniles' categorically reduced
degree of moral culpability, and their greater chances to conform to
societal norms.'2 ' Furthermore, the court found it noteworthy that
C.P. himself, and those who would similarly fall under the PRQJOR
framework, would, "[b]ased on the review of a juvenile judge ... have
been determined to be amenable to the rehabilitative aims of the
juvenile system."122 Accordingly, the court found such juveniles "are
in a category of offenders that does not include the worst of those
who commit crimes as juveniles."23
Moving on to consider the nature of the offense at issue, the
court relied heavily on Graham to establish the truism that sexual
offenses that qualify juveniles for PRQJOR status are less serious
116. Id.
117. Id. at 740.
118. Id. at 740-44.
119. Id. at 742-43.
120. Id. at 740-41.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 741.
123. Id. The court emphasized the relevance of this judicial determination at the
pretrial stage, implying as a matter of fact that juveniles who remain within the juvenile
justice system are not amongst the "worst" offenders. Id. However, as the Supreme Court
has since noted, when a juvenile judge makes the determination to keep an offender
within the juvenile justice system, she "does not know then what she will learn, about the
offender or the offense, over the course of the proceedings," and thus such a
determination will necessarily be imperfect. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474
(2012).
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than murder.124 Based on that premise, the court found, as in
Graham, "a juvenile who did not kill or intend to kill has 'twice
diminished moral culpability' on account of his age and the nature of
his crime." 125 Thus, the court used the nature of the offense at issue-
forcible rape-to conclude that juveniles guilty of such crimes are less
morally culpable than adults who commit murder and are thus less
deserving of the most serious punishments. 126
The court began the next portion of its analysis-its
consideration of the severity of the punishment at stake-by noting
the obvious difference between a registration requirement and "the
harshest and next-harshest possible sentences, death and life without
possibility of parole."127  Yet, the court found such a dramatic
difference was not an obstacle to its analysis, by virtue of the
underlying fact that-as in Graham-Chapter 2950 imposed a lifetime
of punishment.'" Thus, citing Graham for the proposition that a
lifetime prison sentence "is different from such a sentence for an
adult [because] the juvenile will spend a greater percentage of his life
in jail than the adult,"129 the court emphasized a juvenile subject to
lifetime registration would serve a similarly lengthy sentence.3 o
Based upon that commonality, the court stressed that "[w]hile not a
harsh penalty to a career criminal used to serving time in a
penitentiary, a lifetime or even twenty-five year requirement of
community notification means everything to a juvenile.""'
Finally, the court looked towards penological justifications-
namely society's interests in "retribution, deterrence, incapacitation
and rehabilitation"132-to determine whether the "punishment"
Chapter 2950 imposed was legitimate.133 The court structured its
analysis around the goals of the juvenile justice system in Ohio, which
was created in order to "provide for the care, protection, and mental
and physical development of children ... protect the public interest
and safety, hold the offender accountable for the offender's actions,
124. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 741.
125. Id. (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 741-42.
129. Id. at 741 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 742.
132. Id. (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028).
133. Id. at 742-44.
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restore the victim, and rehabilitate the offender."134  The court
conceded that "[a]s for protecting the public interest and safety, some
might argue that the registration and notification requirements
further those aims."13  Yet, the court dismissed every other
penological justification as poorly served by lifetime registration-
and any registration at all in the juvenile context-by deriding the
"effect of forcing a juvenile to wear a statutorily imposed scarlet letter
as he embarks on his adult life." 36
In summary, the court reiterated its strong reliance on the
Graham framework, concluding:
[T]he limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide
offenders who remain within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court, the severity of lifetime registration and
notification requirements of PROJOR status, and the
inadequacy of penological theory to justify the
punishment all lead to the conclusion that the lifetime
registration and notification requirements in R.C.
2152.86 are cruel and unusual. We thus hold that for a
juvenile offender who remains under the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court, the Eighth Amendment forbids
the automatic imposition of lifetime sex-offender
registration and notification requirements.'37
Having thus established the unconstitutionality of Ohio's
juvenile registration scheme under the Eighth Amendment, the court
moved on to consider Ohio's own prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment in its constitution.
2. Ohio's Own Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Ohio Constitution contains its own bill of rights, including a
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment identical to that
134. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.01 (2002).
135. In re CP., 976 N.E.2d at 742. This group would seemingly include the Ohio
General Assembly, who enacted Chapter 2950 based upon findings that given "adequate
notice and information about offenders and delinquent children who commit sexually
oriented offenses[,] ... members of the public and communities can develop constructive
plans to prepare themselves and their children for the offender's or delinquent child's
release from imprisonment, a prison term, or other confinement or detention." OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02(A)(1) (2008).
136. In re C.P., 976 N.E.2d at 743.
137. Id. at 744.
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found in the Eighth Amendment.' As previously interpreted by the
Ohio Supreme Court: "[a]s long as state courts provide at least as
much protection as the United States Supreme Court has provided in
its interpretation of the federal Bill of Rights, state courts are
unrestricted in according greater civil liberties and protections to
individuals and groups."' That greater protection manifests itself as
shielding punishment that would be "shocking to any reasonable
person."'" In this portion of its opinion, the court concluded that-in
light of the unique aims of the juvenile justice system, its traditional
secrecy, and the stigmatizing effects of registration-Chapter 2950
"shock[ed] the sense of justice of the community." 4'
3. The Court's Fourteenth Amendment Inquiry
At last, the court looked to due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to further buttress its holding.4 2 The court enunciated
that based on United States Supreme Court precedent, the due
process standard for the juvenile justice system is "fundamental
fairness."'43 With this standard as the guidepost, the court focused on
the lack of individuality in sentences imposed under Chapter 2950.'"
Crucial to this inquiry was the lack of judicial discretion in imposing
what the court had already deemed a lifelong punishment.'45 To that
end, the court emphasized that "[t]he disposition of a child is so
different from the sentencing of an adult that fundamental fairness to
the child demands the unique expertise of a juvenile judge."'46 Based
on that premise, the court concluded that when lifetime registration is
at stake, "fundamental fairness requires that the judge determine the
appropriateness of any such penalty."147
138. OHIO CONST. art. I § 9.
139. Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163,169 (Ohio 1993).
140. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d at 745 (quoting McDougle v. Maxwell, 203 N.E.2d 334, 336
(Ohio 1964)).
141. Id. at 746. However, if "shocking the community" is the standard, it seems odd to
give no deference to the legislative body comprised of the community's elected
representatives.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 747 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 590 (1971) (plurality
opinion)).
144. Id. at 747-50.
145. Id. at 748.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 749.
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IV. In re C.P.'s Strained Analyses
Before deconstructing In re C.P.'s analyses piecemeal, it is
necessary to delineate what its holding actually means. That is, while
the court's holding seems narrowly applicable to the automatic
imposition of lifetime registration on juveniles adjudicated within the
juvenile justice system, the letter and spirit of the opinion as a whole
suggests a far broader application.
For example, had the Ohio Supreme Court wished to simply find
the automatic imposition of lifetime registration unconstitutional, it
could have restricted itself to a due process analysis to strike down
mandatory sentencing in the juvenile context. Instead, the court
analyzed juvenile registration in light of the Graham factors and
decided those factors "all lead to the conclusion that the lifetime
registration and notification requirements ... are cruel and
unusual." 14 8 This inconsistency led Judge Cupp, dissenting in In re
C.P., to point out that on remand, "the trial court will be forced to
guess what is actually required. .. ."19 Given the court's broad and
sweeping analysis, however, this Note proceeds on the assumption
that, as a practical matter, In re CP. stands as an implicit categorical
ban on lifetime registration for juveniles adjudicated within the
juvenile justice system.
A. Eighth Amendment
Moving on to the reasoning behind the court's holding, In re
C.P.'s Eighth Amendment analysis is fundamentally flawed on two
levels. First, as previously discussed, Williams' basic premise that
Ohio's registration scheme is punitive represents a dramatic
departure from Ohio's own precedent and runs contrary to the great
weight of authority on point."o Second, even if we accept the premise
that Ohio's registration scheme is punitive, the court's designation of
that punishment as cruel and unusual as applied to juveniles is an
almost incomprehensible result.
Indeed, as Judge Cupp argued in his dissent, lost in the majority's
strong rhetoric is the reality that registration schemes are simply too
far removed from both the death penalty and life in prison without
the possibility of parole to justify the court's strong reliance on Roper
148. Id. at 744.
149. Id. at 759 (Cupp, J., dissenting).
150. See supra Part II.
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and Graham."' To be clear, Judge Cupp's dissent paid due deference
to the premises underlying Roper and Graham-that juveniles are
simply different than adults. 15 2 However, Judge Cupp argued that
"the general standards of gross disproportionality and substantial
deference to the legislative judgment expressed within the relevant
statute are not to be abandoned merely because the offender is a
juvenile."'53 Accordingly, Judge Cupp emphasized, with near
disbelief, the incredible juxtaposition the court all but glossed over:
the difference between registration and the death penalty or life
without the possibility of parole.15 4  He noted "the sex-offender
registration and notification provisions at issue in this case are so
significantly different from the punishment at issue in Graham ...
that I am left wondering how the two can possibly be considered
comparable for constitutional purposes.""s
A closer look into the court's analysis reveals how the majority
minimized the relevance of that difference. For example, In re C.P.'s
argument directly echoes Graham; however, the resulting stance that
juvenile offenders who commit rape have "twice diminished moral
culpability" (and thus are not deserving of the most serious
punishments) is a surprising statement to make. Distinct from In re
C.P., the United States Supreme Court in Graham used the premise
of "twice diminished moral culpability" to hold that juveniles who do
not commit murder cannot be subject to the two most serious
punishments our society allows. Had C.P. been sentenced to life
imprisonment, the court would have been correct to invoke this
reasoning; however, in the matter before it, the Ohio Supreme
Court's use of Graham's rhetoric to establish that C.P. is undeserving
of sex offender registration seems disingenuous at best. Additionally,
the court's argument, also taken from Graham, that lifelong
punishment will typically last longer for a juvenile than an adult is
true; yet, applying that argument in the context of registration ignores
the fact that Graham's analysis revolved around a form of
punishment unique in its deprivation of liberty, and substantively
incomparable to lifetime registration.
151. In re CP., 967 N.E.2d at 758 (Cupp, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 757.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 757-58.
155. Id.
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Further proving the novelty of In re C.P.'s analysis is United
States v. Juvenile Male,' an opinion from the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals released only two months prior to In re C.P. There, the
Ninth Circuit similarly addressed an Eighth Amendment challenge to
juvenile registration and reporting under SORNA."' However, the
court not only doubted registration could be considered punishment,
but candidly noted that while "SORNA may have the effect of
exposing juvenile defendants and their families to potential shame
and humiliation for acts committed while still an adolescent, the
statute does not meet the high standard of cruel and unusual
punishment."' Elaborating further, the court reasoned "the
requirement that juveniles register in a sex offender database for at
least twenty-five years because they committed the equivalent of
aggravated sexual abuse is not a disproportionate punishment. ""9
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning and final ruling stands as a stark
reminder of just how far the Ohio Supreme Court departed from
mainstream Eighth Amendment opinion to reach its holding in In re
C.P.
B. Fourteenth Amendment
In re C.P.'s due process analysis, in which the court concluded
the automatic imposition of lifetime registration for juveniles
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment, is similarly troublesome.
For example, in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe,'m the
United States Supreme Court upheld a Connecticut statute that
required convicted sex offenders to register with the state without an
individualized hearing to determine their current dangerousness.161
There, the Court dismissed a due process challenge to the law, finding
"even assuming, arguendo, that [an offender] has been deprived of a
liberty interest, due process does not entitle him to a hearing to
establish a fact that is not material under the Connecticut statute."162
Similarly, in United States v. Juvenile Male, the court reached an
identical holding in the juvenile context, finding where a "'law's
requirements turn on an offender's conviction alone-a fact that a
156. United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999 (9th Cir. 2012).
157. See id.
158. Id. at 1010.
159. Id.
160. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
161. See id.
162. Id. at 7.
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convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguarded
opportunity to contest'-no additional process is required for due
process."'63 Given this precedent, Judge O'Donnell, dissenting in In
re C.P., concluded "[d]iscretion is a matter of grace and not of right.
Thus, the General Assembly was within its authority to impose
automatic registration on juvenile sex offenders . . . ."'"
V. Miller v. Alabama: Judicial Discretion as an Eighth
Amendment Requirement
Though likely correct in a strict due process analysis, Judge
O'Donnell's conclusion that the General Assembly has complete
authority to impose automatic registration for juveniles may
nevertheless have been too broad. In fact, less than three months
after the Ohio Supreme Court decided In re C.P., the United States
Supreme Court's ruling in Miller v. Alabama'65 tangentially bolstered
the majority's argument for individualized juvenile sentencing.
A. The Miller Holding
Miller is the United States Supreme Court's most recent
examination of juveniles, criminal justice, and the Eighth
Amendment." Not surprisingly, in Miller, the Court reaffirmed the
principles underlying all of its recent opinions regarding juveniles
within the criminal justice system." Yet, in so doing, the Court built
upon its holding in Graham to find that, while juveniles may be
sentenced to life in prison without parole for homicide offenses, such
sentences may not be automatically imposed.168
Miller was a consolidation of two separate cases. In each case, a
jury convicted a fourteen-year-old juvenile of murder.'9  Each
163. United States v. Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d 999, 1014 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Doe v.
Tandeske, 361 F.3d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 2004)).
164. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 756 (Ohio 2012) (O'Donnell, J., dissenting).
165. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
166. See id.
167. See id. This included not only Roper and Graham, but also J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2009), in which the Court held the age of a juvenile-when
known to an interrogating officer-must be considered a factor in the officer's Miranda
custody determination.
168. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Specifically, the Court concluded, "[a]lthough we do
not foreclose a sentencer's ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it
to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison." Id.
169. Id. at 2461-62.
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juvenile was then automatically sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole under mandatory state sentencing statutes.o
However, the Court noted that in both cases there were numerous
mitigating factors in addition to the offenders' youth that would have
allowed a judge with discretion to impose lighter sentences."' One
appellant, for example, had participated in a robbery that culminated
in murder, but had not actually killed the victim.1 72 The second
appellant did in fact kill his victim, but had endured a horrific
upbringing and had, by the age of fourteen, already attempted to
commit suicide four times. 7 1
In addressing these sentences, the Court did not conduct its
analysis through the lens of due process, but rather through the
Eighth Amendment as applied primarily in Roper and Graham.174
Thus, the Court began its discussion as it had in each of those cases-
by reiterating that "children are constitutionally different than adults
for sentencing purposes."'7  Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the
majority, went on to acknowledge that Graham's prohibition on life
without the possibility of parole for juveniles specifically exempted
homicide offenses, but noted that "nothing that Graham said about
children is crime-specific."' 76  The Court went on to discuss the
shortcomings of mandatory sentences as applied to juveniles.
Continuing to craft her analysis based on Graham, Justice Kagan
began her consideration of mandatory sentences for juveniles by
reiterating that "[a]n offender's age, we made clear in Graham, is
relevant to the Eighth Amendment, and so criminal procedure laws
that fail to take defendants' youthfulness into account at all would be
flawed.""' Speaking to the mandatory sentencing statutes, the Court
announced:
By removing youth from the balance ... these laws
prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2461.
173. Id. at 2462.
174. See id. at 2469.
175. Id. at 2458.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2467-69.
178. Id. at 2466 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2031 (2010)) (internal
quotations omitted).
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the law's harshest term of imprisonment
proportionately punishes a juvenile offender. That
contravenes Graham's (and also Roper's) foundational
principle: that imposition of a State's most severe
penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as
though they were not children."'
The Court, therefore, did not alter Graham by holding juveniles
may not be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Rather,
the Court removed the decision to impose such sentences on a
mandatory basis away from state legislators and into the hands of
judges. This outcome clearly reverberates in the context of
mandatory juvenile sex offender registration.
B. A Logical Middle Ground Emerges
Miller, like Roper and Graham, speaks to a category of sentences
far more serious than sex-offender registration. In fact, as this Note
points out, registration is generally not considered punitive at all.
Yet, even accepting the premise of punitiveness-as we must under
current Ohio precedent-registration is simply too far removed from
the factual bases of Roper and Graham to justify In re C.P.'s reliance
thereon. However, while the death penalty and life without parole
cannot, and should not, be compared to registration schemes in a
substantive analysis under the Eighth Amendment, Miller's
procedural analysis under the same constitutional provision seems
wholly applicable. That is, the United States Supreme Court's
willingness to dictate an Eighth Amendment requirement for
individuality in juvenile sentencing, like Graham's analysis of children
in general, cannot be "crime-specific."8
Given this new precedent, the Ohio Supreme Court should
revisit and clarify In re C.P. Specifically, the court should allow
juvenile court judges to impose lifetime registration requirements if,
and when, a juvenile's actions are so heinous as to justify such
stringent obligations. In so doing, the court would distance itself from
its sweeping, categorical analysis that placed juvenile registration on
an equal footing with the death penalty and life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. Additionally, this result would still
reflect the principle that juveniles must be treated differently than
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2458.
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adults, by allowing judges to tailor registration requirements to a
particular child based on factors other than conviction or adjudication
alone.
Conclusion
In re C.P.'s holding seems specific enough: "[F]or a juvenile
offender who remains under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the
Eighth Amendment forbids the automatic imposition of lifetime sex-
offender registration and notification requirements."m18 However, as a
practical matter, in view of the court's sweeping analysis, it seems In
re C.P. stands as a categorical ban on lifetime registration for juvenile
sexual offenders.'8
Such a categorical ban, however, cannot be supported by the
Eighth Amendment precedent In re C.P. so heavily relied upon; nor
can In re C.P.'s due process analysis support the weight of its holding.
Clearly, this leaves In re C.P. in a precarious situation. As trial courts
in Ohio will now undoubtedly struggle to determine the bounds of
their discretion in imposing registration requirements on juvenile
offenders, the most effective method to alleviate this confusion is
perhaps the most obvious: revisit In re C.P. using Miller as a
blueprint. Quite simply, Miller held juveniles may be severely
punished for committing severe crimes, but judges must have
individual discretion to do so. If registration is to be treated as
punishment at all, there is no reason to treat juvenile sex offender
registration any differently in Ohio or anywhere else.
181. In re C.P., 967 N.E.2d 729, 744 (Ohio 2012).
182. See supra Part IV.
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